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Abstract
Trust is important for effective coordination in global
software development teams. However, the co-evolution
of trust and coordination is often neglected. To fill the
gap, we develop an evolutionary game theory model.
Using the Behavior-Preference-Constraint (BPC) model
and Adaptive Play, the model challenges the traditional
view of trust as a static “resource” for coordination
and proposes an alternative view that trust dynamically
restricts people’s action choices in interacting with other
team members. Through analyzing the model, we
describe how trust and coordination co-evolve in the
progress of interactions among team members. We
propose three propositions summarizing the long-term
characteristics of coordination and trust in the process.
For example, the co-existence of low trust and high trust
can be a stable state in the long run, which explains why
low trust can always exist even when all team members
strictly prefer effective coordination.

1.

Introduction

Trust is crucial for collaboration activities in global
software development (GSD) teams [1, 2, 3]. Trust
enables teamwork and is closely related to effective
coordination1 , thereby influences team performance
[6]. Researchers in many fields (e.g., CSCW, SE,
IS, etc.) have been investigating trust in distributed
setting extensively. Using various empirical methods,
they have built solid knowledge on the antecedents
of trust in GSD teams, e.g., [7, 8, 9]. We become
more curious about the consequences of the trust, i.e.,
how trust impacts the collaborations in GSD teams.
Particularly, we are interested in the co-evolution of trust
and coordination for coordination is a central construct
which directly influences other important factors such as
team performance, conflicts, product quality [10, 11].
Although trust research is diverse, it is fair to say that
trust is almost always viewed as a static “resource” for
1 “Coordination” means many things [4] in different context. In this
paper, we follow the tradition in GSD literature [5], which restricts it to
“coordinating on work.”
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interpersonal coordination, e.g., [12, 13, 14]. However,
this assumption often fails to hold.
People often
update their trust and thereby adapt their behaviors in
interactions [15]. For example, [1] suggests trust is a
dynamic process interrelated with interaction outcome.
The knowledge on the dynamic relationship between
trust and coordination is very limited. There are many
unanswered questions. E.g., how would trust and
coordination co-evolve in a large enough team? Would
higher trust always bring better coordination? How about
the possibility of coordination failure in the long run?
Is it possible to eliminate low trust using successful
coordination as incentives? In essence, we want to
address the following questions:
In a GSD team, how do trust and coordination
dynamically co-evolve? Can we build an analytical
model to describe the co-evolution?
To answer these questions, we develop an alternative
view of trust based on Belief-Preference-Constraint
(BPC) model [16]. That is: trust is dynamic constraints
of GSD team members’ behaviors in interactions. Trust
impact individuals’ action choices, and thereby the
effectiveness of coordination. Using Adaptive Play in
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) as the analytic tool
[17, 18], we model the long-term co-evolution of trust and
coordination. Our analyses yield three main propositions.
They explain why it is so hard to eliminate low trust
even when all members desire and achieve effective
coordination. I.e., even when some members’ trust is low,
a team still can achieve effective coordination because
people can learn to form conventions with them. Thus,
regarding observable behaviors, a team can establish
“trust” in form of conventions [19]. Specifically, this
work makes the following contributions:
• An alternative view of trust–Trust is conceptualized
as a type of belief which enforces behavioral
constraints and evolves with interaction outcomes.
Comparing with the traditional “resource” based
view, it allows us to understand the dynamic
process of trust and coordination.
• An explanation of the coexistence of low trust and
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high trust equilibrium–It shows that the high trust
cannot be automatically achieved. It also brings
implications on how to mediate the co-evolution of
trust and coordination.
• An EGT model–It provides a rigorous way to
assess the possibility of recurrent coordination
failure in the long run, and a workbench
for future work by incorporating various other
socio-technical factors, such as network structure
and individual differences [20, 21, 22].
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
2 introduces the theoretical background. Section 3 & 4
specify the conceptual interaction process and details of
the model. Section 5 & 6 present the analyses towards the
model and the main propositions. Section 7 & 8 discuss
the related issues and conclude the paper respectively.

2.
2.1.

Background
Trust and Coordination

Trust is a complex construct. There are numerous
attempts to define and conceptualize it. Among many
such efforts, one stream is to conceptualize it in terms of
rational action choice in the interaction between trustee
and trustor. Specifically, we adopt the definition in [23]:
trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the
actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control
that other party.” (pp. 712).
Coordination is essential to regulate collaborations
to achieve large system goal. It has been studied in
multiple disciplines [4]. Coordination can be formal or
informal, and influenced by various factors ranging from
organization design [24] to techniques of managing task
interdependencies. GSD projects are full of various task
interdependencies, hence the coordination on work is
crucial to team success [25, 5]. Besides, the effectiveness
of coordination may also influence the quality of software
[26]. Studies such as [27] discuss the possibility of
improving coordination via organization design.
Conventionally, trust is considered as a precondition
for effective coordination [3]. For instance, [28] claimed
that trust would reduce coordination conflicts; Yuan et
al [29] argued that trust is one of the antecedents of
coordination effectiveness in an open source project. But
most of them do not consider the dynamics between trust
and coordination. They investigate a static “snapshot”
rather than a dynamic process of trust and coordination.
Even in the literature that studies on-going trust, such as
[12], trust is treated as “static”. Furthermore, the majority
of literature on the relationships between trust and

coordination heavily relies on field observations. While
they do well in collecting real-world data, the knowledge
they produce is hard to be cross-examined, generalized
and extended. Moreover, it is almost impossible to draw
quantifiable predictions on long-term dynamics.

2.2.

Trust as Behavioral Constraints

As a “belief”, trust introduces behavioral constraints
[16]. BPC approach assumes that an individual acts
according to a specific set of feasible actions which
depend on her preferences. Constraints resulting from
belief impose further limitations to this action set. Hence,
trust impacts individuals’ behavior choices in interaction.
Moreover, people who have similar trust often share
more feasible behaviors in common. In this paper, we
make the bold assumption that all team members prefer
effective coordination only with differences in how much
stronger the coordination preference is relative to each
individual’s other personal preferences (expressed as the
“idiosyncratic payoff” in the model, see section 4). This
bold assumption is reasonable in our context since, for
work situations that we focus on, when coordination is
achieved, the payoffs are higher than when coordination
fails. We rule out the possibility of public goods game
in which players may prefer social loafing for the payoff
might be better when using anti-social behaviors. To
sum up, the feasible actions in dyadic interactions are
determined by the externalization of trust beliefs.

2.3.

Coordination Game

Coordination game is an abstraction of coordination
in real-world interactions. The basic, non-dynamic,
2-player, symmetric coordination game is shown in Fig.
1. The payoff for individuals is identical when they
coordinate on action Red or Blue. It has two pure Nash
equilibria: (Red, Red) and (Blue, Blue), which represent
two social efficient states. (Red, Blue) or (Blue, Red)
fails to achieve coordination, and the payoffs of them
are strictly worse than successful coordination. The
coordination game can also involve many players and
many strategies.
Player II
Red

Blue

Red

1, 1

0, 0

Blue

0, 0

1, 1

Player I

Figure 1. An example of coordination game.

When trust functions as constraints, it reduces the
action space of forming potential coordination. Fig 2.
gives an example of a 2-player, 3-strategy coordination
game. Ideally, there are 9 action pairs. However, each
player can only select actions from 2 of the 3 strategies
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due to the trust restriction. Player I can choose action
from (x1 , x2 ) while Player II can choose (x2 , x3 ).
The number of action pairs is 4 (the “gray area” in the
top-right of fig. 2). Trust alters the game structure
and reduces the number of potential equilibria although
(x1 ,x1 ) and (x2 ,x2 ) do provide better outcomes.
Player II
x

x

x

x

1+0.8, 1+0.8

0.8, 0

0.8, 0.8

x

0, 0.8

1+0, 1+0

0, 0.8

x

0.8, 0.8

0.8, 0

1+0.8, 1+0.8

1

1

Player I

2

3

2

3

begins, they tend to behave according to baseline trust.
2. The different trust levels restrict options of behaviors.
3. The mismatches between two subjects’ behaviors lead
to coordination failure in mutual interaction.
4. Although the baseline trust may not change too much,
individuals update their situational trust according to the
interaction outcomes.
5. Even for a team with long collaboration history, trust
still varies.
Team
Member I

Belief: Trust

Figure 2. Trust as behavioral constraints.

2.4.

Team
Member II

Interaction:where
Coordination/Mis-coordination Happens
BPC

Behaviors

Behaviors

BPC

Belief: Trust

Adaptive Play

Young [17] proposed the Adaptive Play to describe
the evolution of social institutions. It allows us to
predict which solutions will be chosen in the long run
by self-interested agents with limited information and
resource, hence offers a good solution for modeling
co-evolution of trust and coordination. It aims to describe
“a world in which people base their decisions on limited
data, use simple predictive models, and sometimes do
unexplained or even foolish things”[18]. Basically,
the adaptive play reflects a decision maker’s “Bounded
Rationality” [30] in real-world interaction.
In each round, each player uses simple dynamics to
decide which strategy to play. It assumes that each player
has limited memory (m) about past rounds and a sample
with size s over m. The decisions are not necessarily
to be optimal, which reflects the real decision-making
situations with limited information processing ability. For
the decision in current play relies on a limited number
of prior dynamics, the whole process is a finite Markov
process. In this process, a state in period t can be
represented by the m-history of t. The generic process
is named as P 0 . For this process, an absorbing set is
a set of states that are all reachable from one another
but cannot reach any states outside of the set. Due to
the differences in initial states, there may be over one
absorbing set. However, if adaptive play converges to an
absorbing state, clearly the game must have a strict pure
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This process may be
perturbed by allowing agents to make mistakes.

3.

Adaptive Play [Young 1993]

Conceptual Interaction Process

Drawing from prior literature on empirical studies of
trust and coordination in GSD teams (e.g. [31, 32, 2, 33,
34, 35, 36, 37]), we can summarize the following five
simple yet prevalent insights:
1. Team members can be classified into subgroups
according to their baseline trust. When collaboration

Figure 3. The conceptual dyadic interaction process.

We develop a conceptual interaction process (Fig. 3)
focusing on coordination and trust. Let us assume all
interactions in a GSD team are dyadic (other cases can be
modeled as a set of dyadic interactions [19]). Before an
interaction, a player only has limited, fragile information.
It may be extracted from her own (or others’) histories
with those who are similar to her opponent. She then
identifies the most probable behavior of her opponent by
sampling the limited past histories. She would select a
behavior from the action set shaped by her trust according
to her assumption of her opponent’s action. We do not
care about the details about how trust beliefs restrict
behaviors. Instead, we simply assume there is an invisible
psychological belief externalization process to generate
observable actions. Once both players have formed their
actions, the interaction starts. The coordination can be
either success or failure in this round. The players may
review and adapt their trust beliefs in future according to
coordination outcomes.

4.

The Model

Our model G is a game consists of following elements:
Player. There are n players in G. We assume that there is
no new player entering or leaving. The set of players is
denoted by N, and indexed by i. So, ni denotes a player.
Trust Levels. Assume there are finite K different trust
levels and they form a ladder structure. Every player
belongs to one level in any given period, denoted by
g ∈ G = ∪1≤k≤K gk . Each level represents a unique
degree of trust (shared by its members) towards others.
A player in gk is referred as gk -member. The set of
gk -member is N k where |Nk | = nk. A level is empty if
it has no member (nk = 0). Everyone knows her own trust
level and others’, but has no prior knowledge about the
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action sets associated to other levels.
Strategies. We assume a set X with cardinality L is the set
of all actions that can potentially be used in a two-player
round. A player of gk must choose action from the pure
strategy set Xk ∈ X = ∪1≤k≤K Xk . So, we have:
Condition 1: Trust Constraints A member of the trust
level gk in period t can only make behavioral choice from
the action set: Xk , when interacting in current period.
Such restriction might come about through the
externalization of trust perception (fig. 2). If |Xk | = L,
gk -members have no restriction to their actions resulting
from trust. However, this strict high trust level does not
necessarily exist. In fact, it is almost impossible to find
such a trust level in any team.

4.1.

Individuals’ Payoff

The coordination impact both parties’ payoffs. (1)
presents the payoff function which satisfies the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem [38]:
u(xi , x i ) = {

P Interaction + πi,x , if succeeds
πi,x ,
else

(1)
P Interaction represents the payoff from successful
coordination. We assume it is 1 if the coordination
succeeds, and the players only receive idiosyncratic
payoff in all other cases. π i, x is the idiosyncratic
payoff of each player, which reflects the preference on
different actions of each trust level. Assuming all players
prefer successful coordination, πi,x < 1.This ensures
that the whole payoff is determined by the payoff from
interaction, and excludes the anti-social behaviors.

4.2.

Adaptive Play Process

Round. The game is played in discrete periods, denoted
by t = 1, 2, 3, ... T. In each round, two players are
randomly selected to participate in a social interaction.
Learning Dynamics. Adaptive play assumes a player has
limited information and information processing ability.
She plays game by examining a limited sample of history,
and select action according to her expectation to her
opponent’s action in this period. She forms expectation
based on the prior plays of members of her partners’ trust
group. Suppose two players were from trust levels gk and
gj , we name this interaction as j-k interaction. Before the
play starts, they can access limited number m of previous
j-k interactions (namely, j-k history) due to the limitation
of their memory. j-k history defines the current state at t
, and the play in this round carries the process to another
state2 . Table 1 shows the formal denotations and their
meaning. To form the expectation, the player samples s
2 The play in this round generates the newest j-k interaction instance
which replaces the oldest one in the memory.

Table 1. Denotations and Meanings (memory).
Meanings
xt,−1
j−k

The most recent action of gk-member in j-k
interaction

t,−m
xj−k

The m-th most recent action of gk-member in
j-k interaction

xt,−1
j−k

The most recent action pair of both gj -member
and gk-member in j-k interaction

xt,−m
j−k

The m-th most recent action pair of both
gj -member and gk-member in j-k interaction

htj−k

t,−m
(xj−k
,...xt,−1
j−k ): The collection of action pairs
in the m previous j-k interactions

from j-k history (htj−k ) in round t. The other player in this
interaction does the similar thing.
After the sampling, the players locally maximize their
expected payoff in the current period. If no mistake,
both two players choose the best replies according to
their resulting sample proportion. In section 5.3, making
mistake becomes possible. We assume the probability of
making a mistake is . Fig. 4 describes the process.

4.3.

Convention vs. Coordination Failure

Convention is the best strategies emerging from
interactions [39]. It is a pure Nash equilibrium that has
been played by the entire population for the periods in
which memory keeps [17]. Obviously,
j-k interaction is a
Qm
Markov process defined on
(X j, X k). The state in t+1
(ht+1
j−k ) is determined by the state in t. If the convention
has been formed on action y, the history at t should
t,−m
t,−1
be: h∗j−k = (xj−k
,...xj−k
)=((y,y)...(y,y)). While players
in all j-k interaction keep playing this convention, the
interaction payoff equation will be guaranteed. For the
idiosyncratic payoff is strictly less than 1, the convention
always brings optimal payoff. Recurrent Coordination
Failure is another extreme case. In a state of this
class, players cannot learn any useful knowledge from
the history to form a strategy to get interaction payoff.
t−m
t−i
Hence, we define it as: h∗j−k = ((xt−m
j−k , xk−j ),...(xj−k ,
t−1
t−1
t−i
t−i
xt−i
/ Xk and xk−j
∈
/ Xj .
k−j ),...(xj−k , xk−j )) if xj−k ∈
No j-k interaction will achieve coordination in future.

5.

Coordination in the Long Run

We will explore if members of different trust
levels could eventually develop effective coordination
(conventions) with each other.
By answering this
question, we reveal the trend of potential recurrent
coordination failure in the long run. In this section, we
assume that nobody changes her initial trust level. The
analysis follows the approach in [18], which allows both
undesirable recurrent coordination failure) and desireable
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Look at current
j-k history

Draw a
sample history

Apply best
reply dynamics

Player I from g j

Look at current
j-k history

Make decision
on the action
Mistake is allowed in
decision-making.

Draw a
sample history

Apply best
reply dynamics

Interaction

Update the
j-k history

Make decision
on the action

Player II from g k

Figure 4. The process of play in period t.

conventions as stochastic stable states. Essentially, we
find that:
<Coordination in the Long Run> If j = k, a convention
for j-k interactions will be achieved. If j 6= k, the
possibility of recurrent coordination failure does not only
exists but also may be very high for j-k interactions in the
long-run regardless of the configurations of j-k.
According to Fig. 4, players in a j-k interaction make
their decisions by sampling from j-k history only. Hence,
what will happen in a j-k interaction is independent of
other levels if no player changes her trust level. To
simplify the discussion and without the loss of generality,
we focus on a special instance of j-k interaction, which is
the 1-2 interaction. This simplification does not influence
the generality of the conclusions, for 1-2 only indicates
this pair of players from two different trust levels.

5.1.

Coordination in the Unperturbed Process

0
We use P1−2
to denote the unperturbed process (no
0
mistake). In P1−2
, players form both trust level strictly
follow the best reply dynamics. In period t, current state
w is determined by the history in t, i.e. wt =ht1−2 , and the
state space is defined by the m-fold product of X1 and
X2 . According its definition, conventions should be the
actions that are acceptable for both players.
Hence, all
T
potential conventions form a set C = X1 X2 indexed by
c. If C = φ, no convention could be reached no matter how
long this process continues, the only outcome is recurrent
coordination failure. Hence, we concern more about if
the process reach conventions when C 6= φ.
The payoff structure in (1) contains two components.
A player will always get an idiosyncratic payoff.
However, she may miss the interaction payoffs. It
is possible that the maximal idiosyncratic payoff is so
attractive for a player with bounded rationality that she
keeps playing it and eventually is trapped in recurrent
fk ={e
coordination failure. Let X
x|g
xi,k ∈ argmax πi,x }
refers the set of actions maximize a players idiosyncratic
payoff. Applying this heuristic, we define a new
relationship named “Small-Different”.
fj T
Two trust levels (gj and gk ) are Small-Different iff X
fk = φ. and X 1 T X2 6= φ. If X 1 T X2 = φ, they are
X

Total-Different.
Basically, Small-Different indicates two trust levels
share no preferred action but do have some mutual
acceptable actions to be potential conventions. In
fig. 2, suppose Player I in g1 and Player II in g2 ,
possible actions for g1 is {x1 , x2 } and x1 is preferred
while possible actions for g2 is {x2 , x3 } and x3 is
preferred. According to above definition, g1 and g2
are Small-Different but not Total-Different, and x2 is
potentially to be a convention.
If 1-2 are Small-Different trust levels, the recurrent
coordination failure can be defined as a set of states of
f1 × X
f2 )m , which indicates no any mutual acceptable
(X
actions appear in the history. For above example, if a
history was filled with (x1 , x3 ), it would be recurrent
coordination failure.
For a Markov process, it is
an absorbing set of states that each of them can be
accessed by peer states in this set (state transition
probability is positive in a finite number of periods) but
no one can access the states outside this set (no positive
state transition probability). We propose the following
proposition:
Coordination Proposition. Suppose β = s/m, if β ≤
0
would almost always reach: 1.
1/2, process Pj−k
A convention if j-k are not Different; 2. Either a
convention or a recurrent coordination failure if j-k are
Small-Different; 3. A recurrent coordination failure if j-k
are Total-Different.
Note that beta ≤ 1/2 is not a strict bound, it is
used to guarantee the randomness of the Markov process.
A detailed proof is in the online supplement (https:
//goo.gl/RywBr2). If j=k, this proposition is still
valid, because j=k is actually a special case of the first
fj T X
fk =X
fj =X
fk . This property shows
case where X
that the long-term effectiveness of coordination between
players from the same trust levels will definitely reach a
convention (successful coordination).

5.2.

What Happens to the Concrete Example?

Let us go back to the example in fig. 2. In any single
round, if both players choose action x2 , the coordination
will be reached. So, the question is: can they learn
this social-efficient equilibrium and keep playing it in
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d1

Simply extend it to all possible actions, we have:
Recurrent
Coordination Failure

Convention
d2

d1 = ds(min (

Figure 5. Convention ↔ recurrent coordination failure.

the long run? Coordination Proposition cannot give
a deterministic conclusion since Player I and II are
from Small-Different trust levels. We only know that
the interactions between them reaches either convention
or recurrent coordination failure. The next sub-section
answers this question by studying the perturbed process
in which players’ small mistakes are allowed.

5.3.

q
+ πi,xc ≥ πi,x0
s

d2 = ds(1 − max(

Hence, we have q = ds(maxx∈X1 T X2 πi,x − πi,xc )e.
3 Non-strictly, “resistance” can be viewed as the number of mistakes
required for a specific transition.

max
T

i∈N1 x∈X1

max
T

xc ∈X1

πi,xc ))e (3)
X2

πi,x −

max
T

xc ∈X1

X2

πi,xc ))e
X2

(4)
Now, we define two new measures for idiosyncratic
payoff to formally established this relationship.
π + = max(

(2)

πi,x −
X2

By similar reasoning, we can calculate d2 .

Coordination in the Perturbed Process

The interaction of players from Small-Different levels
may result in recurrent coordination failure. But if
the possibility is low, we can draw stronger and more
favorable conclusions. However, following analysis will
show that this is not true. We resort to the stochastic
stability framework of the perturbed process to uncover
whether recurrent coordination failure is frequent. We

refer to the perturbed process as P1−2
, where  is the
probability of making a mistake when forming action.
When a player makes a mistake, she randomly selects
an action. Assuming  approaches 0, we can draw
conclusions on the asymptotic stability of the process.
Mistakes drive the switch between convention and
recurrent coordination failure. If the “basin of attraction”
of the latter is large enough, it is very hard to switch to
conventions. Intuitively, idiosyncratic payoffs impact the
“basin of attraction.” Fig. 5 describes the transitions
between convention and recurrent coordination failure.
We define d1 as the minimal resistance from recurrent
coordination failure to convention3 , and d2 is the maximal
resistance from convention to recurrent coordination
failure. If recurrent coordination failure becomes stable,
d1 must be greater than d2 .
Calculate d1 and d2 . Consider a transition from
recurrent coordination failure to convention. In period

t, P1−2
is in recurrent coordination failure,
hence, any
T
sample x’ from ht1−2 satisfies x0 ∈ X1 X2 = φ. Now,
suppose in next q periods,
T g2 − member makes mistake
by selecting xc ∈ X1 X2 continuously. In period
t+q+1, the probability for a sample contains all q play of
Xc is positive. Here, the expected playoff is qs + πi,xc .
To ensure this player plays xc , the expected payoff of
playing xc should be greater than playing x’, we need:

max
T

i∈N1 x∈X1

π − = min (

πi,x −

max
T

X2

max
T

X2

i∈N1 x∈X1

i∈N1 x∈X1

max
T

X2

max
T

X2

xc ∈X1

πi,x −

xc ∈X1

πi,xc )

πi,xc )

If d1 > d2 , according (3) and (4), we now have
d1 > d2 ⇒ dsπ − e > ds(1 − π + )e

(5)

s is reducible in above inequation, hence we have:
π− + π+ > 1

(6)

Given π + and π − , we propose following proposition:
-Coordination Proposition. Suppose β = s/m, if β ≤
1/2, and j-k are Small-Different trust levels. If π +

+ π − > P Interaction, process P1−2
would have
recurrent coordination failure as its unique stochastically
stable states.
The discussion in this section sketches the proof of
the proposition. What does this proposition imply? It
is similar to “black hole” theory in physics, the higher
π + is, the interaction is more likely to enter the recurrent
coordination failure, and the higher π − is, the more
difficult to leave. When they are big enough, nothing
could leave these states. They form the “event horizon”
of the recurrent coordination failure. π + + π − >
P Interaction is very weak, the recurrent coordination
failure may be common. Let us answer the question about
the concrete example in Fig. 3. For the preferences are
“symmetric” (the idiosyncratic payoffs πm of preferable
action are same for both players), π + = π − = 0.8. Hence,

π + + π − = 1.6 > 1. So, P1−2
will be stuck in the
recurrent coordination failure states.

6.

Dynamic Trust Evolution

When people update their trust, what will happen?
Since cross-level interactions often raise the recurrent
coordination failure, this question can be expressed in
another form: is it possible that all levels to be merged
into one high trust to avoid coordination failure? We now
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show a team that has K (K ≥ 3) trust levels would almost
always evolve into a team has two levels. Moreover, one
of them will be a low trust level, while the other is the
higher trust level dominating the lower. This evolution
may take a long period, or even longer than a team’s life
cycle. Basically, we demonstrate that it is unlikely for
a large enough team to achieve a unified high trust level
only motivated by coordination benefits.
Suppose there are three trust levels, one is strictly
higher than the other two. We will show the high trust
level and one of the other two would stably coexist
in the long run. Once this is established, we can
reach similar argument for N -level team, which would
eventually merge into three-level or two-level setting if
the convergence occurs.

6.1.

Individual Trust Update

Update Timing. At the beginning of each round, a player
has an opportunity to review her trust and decide whether
or not to update her belief and corresponding action
profile with a non-negative probability ϕ (change rate).
We assume the “change” is costless for it is a mental
activity. This change is determined by the evaluation
of potential payoffs based on best-reply dynamics (i.e.,
whether the change yields better immediate payoffs).
Process. For players are allowed to change their trust, the
distribution of trust levels is dynamically relevant to their
decisions. The state in current period t should contain
the history of play in this period and the distribution
of players over the trust for the change of trust level
between t-1 and t. We name the current state as w,
which is in a much larger finite state space W. Now,
the process is assumed to start from an initial state w0 .
When the process starts, there are already m plays in each
j-k interaction as the prior knowledge. Pw,w0 denotes
the transition probability between w and w’. Hence, we
define the adaptive process as a finite Markov process,
whose transition probability matrix is relevant to the
parameter ϕ.

6.2.

The Convergence of Trust Levels

So, what will happen for a team with three trust levels
in the long run if people could change their trust levels?
To simplify the discussion, we first make an assumption
that every interaction in that setting is a 2 × 2 game, and
the actions are limited to X={x1 , x2 }. Then, we can
simply define three trust levels {g1 , g2 , g3 } indirectly,
which g1 only allows action x1 , g2 only allows action x2 ,
and g3 allows both of them. Besides, we assume that each
player prefers one action (x1 or x2 ), and both two actions
have at least one player who prefers it.
We define a set of states that all players prefer x1 most
are from g1 while the others who prefer action x2 already
converge into g3 . Obviously, in these states, the group g2

does not exist any longer. These states can be described
f1={w|N 2=φ, N 1=N
f1, and N 3=N
f2}. Similarly, we
as W
can define another set of state that all players prefer x2 are
in g2 while the others who prefer action x1 most form g3 .
In this case, the group g2 is eliminated. Formally, these
f2={w|N 1=φ, N 2=N
f2, and N 3=N
f1}. Assume
states are W
S
f =W
f1 W
f2.
W
Now, let us suppose the interaction starts with t=0.
We use µt (w|w0 ) to denote the relative frequency
that a state is reached by the unperturbed process
P 0 in a finite number of periods. With the periods
increase, it is reasonable to assume that µt (w|w0 )
almost always approaches to the probability distribution
µt→∞ (w|w0 ). In this process, if the µt→∞ (w|w0 ) has
positive probability in some specific states, these states
would be legal absorbing states of a given process. The
following proposition establishes the convergence.
Convergence Proposition. For a team that has three
trust levels, if the dynamic process begins in any state
w0 and all three trust levels are not empty in this state.
Suppose the sample size is no more than half of the
f we have:
memory size, t approaches ∞, and w ∈ W
µt→∞ (w|w0 ) → 1, while ϕ → 0

(7)

The proof of the convergence proposition is in
the same online supplement (https://goo.gl/
RywBr2).
The proposition indicates that when
individuals seldom change their trust levels, the high level
of trust (here, g3 ) will be almost always (the probability
approaches 1) in a companion of exactly one less trust
level, although we cannot determine which less trust level
will survive. However, we can determine which group
survives by observing the convention of the interaction
whose both parties are from g3 . If the convention is
on x1 , the g2 has been eliminated, and vice versa. In
both situations, high-trust individuals yield to low trust
conventions to avoid coordination failure. Even though,
this final two-level trust cannot be guaranteed to be
reached in the real life due to many practical limitations.
We will show an example in next section. Please note that
our focus is NOT to demonstrate all teams will achieve a
two-level trust state in a reasonable time frame, but to
demonstrate:
“the High DIFFICULTY (if not impossibility) of
achieving a single-level trust state in acceptable period”.

6.3.

Trust Convergence in GSD Teams

Considering a scenario described in the left part of
fig. 6, there is a team located in two different places. In
each location, there are three different trust levels. Due to
the lack of memory of cross-location interaction between
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Figure 6. Local-Preferred Trust Convergence.

the members these two locations, the process of global
convergence may be very slow. In some situations, the
global level convergence may fail to be achieved. We
will not formally present a new model to demonstrate this.
Instead, we discuss this point in narratives.
Suppose the two locations are Loc1 and Loc2, and in
a specific period t > 0, the whole system is in a special
state that all possible interactions between Loc1 and Loc2
are in recurrent coordination failure, and the all possible
interactions within Loc1 or Loc2 are in some conventions.
Starting from this state, it is more likely that there is an
independent convergence process in each location that
makes the global state turn out to be the right half of fig. 6.
In this state, the probability of convergence at the global
level is small for there are few opportunities for both
locations to build diverse enough memory, which leads
to interactions across locations are randomly determined.
Individuals are more likely to make decisions according
to the idiosyncratic payoffs, which leads to recurrent
coordination failure(-Coordination Proposition).

7.
7.1.

Discussion and Implications
How Trust Influences Coordination?

Different trust levels matter. In the case of no
trust level switch, the conventions almost always can
be achieved if people in interaction are not from
Small/Total-Different levels.
For the players are
from Small-Different levels, their interactions result in
recurrent coordination failure in a high probability. So,
we can develop a conceptual process of the co-evolution
of trust and coordination with the behavior constraints.
The improved trust reduces the behavior constraints
and makes more behaviors mutually acceptable, thereby
contributes to forming conventions on these behaviors.
Once the conventions have been built, what will happen?
Ceteris paribus, the system would be in stable states
where people simply repeat the conventions to achieve
coordination. Nobody has the incentive to change her
behaviors since she already achieves the optimal payoff
and is able to keep enjoying it. We argue that it is almost
impossible for the whole team to share high trust for
there is no intensive for people in lower-trust to improve
their trust. The improved trust will not lead to better
coordination for high trust people learned to conform to

them to avoid coordination failure in the 2-level setting.
Even when nobody trusts any others, there are still
chances for good coordination. Under this circumstance,
the behavior choices are very limited. The effective
coordination is achieved through strict control over
behaviors. E.g., in a GSD team where team members
have no trust towards each other, people have to spend
extra time to do unnecessary work to fulfill others’
expectations. Comparing with the conventions formed
in high trust setting, this is less favorable because the
effectiveness of coordination is achieved at the price
of extra intra-organization transaction cost [40]. This
partially explains why high-trust teams perform better.

7.2.

Team vs. Individual

The -Coordination proposition indicates that
long-term recurrent coordination failures are closely
related to the “basin of attraction” created by
idiosyncratic payoffs.
According to equation (6),
large idiosyncratic payoffs are more likely leading to
recurrent coordination failure for both π + and π − would
increase if idiosyncratic payoffs become larger. If we
change the idiosyncratic payoff in fig. 2 from 0.8 to 0.2,
no recurrent coordination failure will survive. Hence,
coordination achieves by lowering idiosyncratic payoffs
which represent one’s own preferences at a specific
trust level. When a team has high team cohesion, its
members’ idiosyncratic payoff would be less important
for them, sometimes, they may even sacrifice their own
preferences for their team [41]. Therefore, if the team
cohesion is high, recurrent coordination failures will
be less likely even when the trust may vary a lot. You
may not trust another team member, but if you concern
team’s achievements more than your own preferences,
you may be willing to adapt to her by (partially) giving
up some idiosyncratic payoff. Thus, while the trust
varies, increasing the team cohesion might be a remedy
for coordination failure.

7.3.

Managerial and Design Implications

Conventions are social controls [42]. Social control
is often viewed to be contradictory to building trust.
But, our study shows the trust itself is also a type
of social control, e.g., the high-trust people often
need to conform to the low-trust group’s convention in
cross-group interactions. The duality of trust and social
control has been discussed in literature [43], particularly
in virtual organization context, as [44] highlighted:
Trust and control have typically been viewed
as opposites or substitutes, ...We argue that
trust and control are closely intertwined
and often mutually reinforcing approaches to
managing distributed work...
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Our results also partially support a more aggressive view
than balancing trust and control [45]. That is: trust may
be a type of social control. The benefit of this view is
that it enables us to investigate trust and social control
in a unified framework. Moreover, the coordination, as
the results of social control, can be better predicted by
the presence of trust. How to leverage social control
mechanisms to enhance trust is also an interesting issue.
Researchers have developed many computational
tools to improve trust in GSD teams.
However,
they may lead to trust decreases. For example, if
faithfully displaying an individual’s past collaborative
traces, it is likely that the “bad history” would also
be shown. Therefore, trust may be hurt rather than
improved. But, the “hurt” may help build reasonable
behavior expectations.
The expectations help to
develop conventions or social controls, and hence reduce
coordination failures [39]. If a tool only displays one’s
positive history but hides the negatives, the manipulated
trust may lead to coordination failure by reinforcing
wrong expectation [46]. Unless the trust is unanimously
high among all members which is unlikely [47], the risk
of concurrent coordination failure may always exist.
Let us rethink the role of computational tools in
supporting trust building. Promoting trust is good but
not necessarily always brings better coordination. Trust
improvement may make people become overconfident.
The interactions among tools, trust, social learning,
and coordination are very complex. Based on our
results and Arrow’s arguments on trust in large teams
[46], we hypothesize that trust tools promote trust
in a small team or where the systematic risks are
low, hence improve coordination. When a team is
large, effective coordination more relies on forming
expectations and social learning rather than trust. In the
latter case, tools are valuable to enhance understandings
and to facilitate learning between a trustee and a
trustor, which helps develop the conventions during
interactions. Since facilitating the learning of remote
collaborators’ behaviors is crucial for improving the
coordination, Collaboration tools should enable the
information cascading over different locations.

8.

Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we develop an Evolutionary Game
Theory (EGT) model to describe the co-evolution of trust
and coordination in Global Software Development (GSD)
teams. The analyses of the model reveal how trust and
coordination co-evolve in a GSD team. Team members
with different levels of trust can form conventions to
avoid coordination failure, however, even interactions
of individuals from Small-Different trust levels may
end with the recurrent coordination failure. Moreover,

the high-trust people tend to conform to the low-trust
people’s convention while the latter has few incentives to
improve their trust in the long run. Hence, it is difficult
to eliminate low trust in a large enough GSD team. The
model builds a theoretical foundation for investigating
the co-evolution of trust and coordination and can be
easily extended to incorporate various individual and
organizational factors.
We plan to develop simulations to identify the details
of the co-evolution process. Besides, we will incorporate
network features into the current model. We will also
extend the model to incorporate other social factors
such as personality, organizational role, and so on.
All mathematical models, no matter how sophisticated
they are, are imperfect abstractions of the real-world
practices. The external validity should be examined
through empirical evidence. We have planned empirical
field experiments to validate the model and related
propositions directly.
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